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1
Chapter One: The Metaethical Questions
This thesis will explain in detail two closely related but jointly defensible moral realist
positions. I show how each position responds to the initial dilemma of whether moral
judgments are propositions. The first position, defended by Richard Boyd, claims that a
significant analogy exists between scientific realism and moral realism, such that if one can
establish the plausibility of the former than one can draw similar conclusions about the later.
The second position, defended by David Brink, describes at depth the nature of moral
properties and our justification for believing that our moral judgments are in fact true. I will
defend this combined position against an objection that the position is inherently
contradictory. I show that one can coherently maintain both positions without a
contradiction.

I. The questions of metaethics
A series of questions must be considered in order to determine what specific position
one will take in the realm of metaethics, including the position I defend in this thesis.1 One
of the most fundamental questions, a question of meaning, is whether moral judgments state
propositions that have truth-values. Almost all answers to this question are characterized as
either non-cognitivist or cognitivist.2 Non-cognitivists generally claim that moral judgments
do not express beliefs; therefore they are not apt for truth-value. Emotivism, one species of a
non-cognitivist position, purports to show that moral judgments express or recommend
1

Alexander Miller’s “flow-chart” approach to delineating metaethics was the inspiration for my series of
questions approach which follows. Although I do not claim the list is exhaustive or even fully adequate.
See Alexander Miller’s An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity, 2003.
2
For a further explanation of why sometimes the line between metaethical positions is blurred see, Van
Roojen, Mark, “Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed), URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/Spring2004/entries/moralcognitivism/.

attitudes and that these expressions of our attitudes are not true or false. So, when one utters
the statement ‘Burning cats is wrong’, according to the emotivist, all we are really saying is
‘Boo to burning cats’ and I recommend this same attitude to you.3 A.J. Ayer, e.g.,
claims that moral judgments contain no objective validity, but are
“pure expressions of feeling and as such do not come under the category
of truth or falsehood. They are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry or pain or
command is unverifiable—because they do not express genuine propositions.”4
Cognitivism, in contrast, claims that moral judgments do posses truth-values and
thus moral judgments do express beliefs. Some claim that cognitivism is the common sense
position in metaethics: David Copp states, “…it is natural to us, as we engage in moral
thought, to have beliefs that commit us to the existence of moral propositions.”5
Cognitivism seems to capture our intuitions about moral judgments. For example, imagine
that two adolescents are burning a cat. One of them thinks that the action is right and the
other thinks that it is wrong. It seems that one of the adolescents must be mistaken. In order
for one of them to be mistaken, the moral judgment ‘Burning cats is wrong’ must, by
necessity, possess a truth-value. Furthermore, if moral judgments are capable of being true or
false, their truth-value depends on whether they actually describe the way things really are.6
The issue of whether moral judgments possess truth-values leads us to the second
question. If we take the cognitivist view that moral judgments have truth-value, we then
must ask whether these moral judgments are at least sometimes true.

3

One thing to note is that the noncognitivist is not claiming that the speaker actually has to have that
particular attitude. It could be that case that the function of moral judgments is only to evoke noncognitive
attitudes from others towards an object or action.
4
Ayer, A.J. “Critique of Ethics and Theology,” in Essays on Moral Realism. Ed Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. 32.
5
Copp, David. Morality, Normativity, and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 16.
6
I am assuming a correspondence theory of truth here, although in chapter 2, we shall see a realist
coherence theory.

At least one cognitivist, J.L. Mackie, claims that although moral judgments are apt
for truth-value, in fact, all of them are false.7 Mackie claims that moral judgments do state
propositions; they are the types of statements that can be true or false, but they are
all in fact false. He develops three independent arguments for believing that we are all in
‘error’ about truth of moral judgments. One argument is that if it were true that some actions
were objectively good, then they would be inherently prescriptive; they would demand that
any agent pursue the action. For such properties to exist, to be objective values, “they would
be entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else
in the universe…[they would have] “not-to-be-doneness somehow built in.”8 Since the world
does not contain these demands it follows that moral judgments are all false. The majority of
cognitivists do not agree with Mackie. Rather, most cognitivists claim that at least some of
our moral judgments are in fact true. In this thesis, I defend a cognitivist position that
ascribes the value of true to at least some moral judgments.
The third question to consider is whether moral beliefs concern matters of fact that
are independent of human opinion. David Brink asks whether ethics studies “real objects and
events whose existence and nature are largely independent of our theorizing about them?”9
Realism and irrealism are the two sides of this debate.
Brink characterizes realism in ethics as asking “us to take moral claims literally, as
claims that purport to describe the moral properties of people, actions, and institutions—
properties that obtain independently of our theorizing.”10 Irrealism or antirealism agrees with

7

See Mackie, J.L. “The Subjectivity of Values,” in Essays on Moral Realism. Ed Geoffrey Sayre-McCord
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
8
Ibid, 112
9
Brink, David. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989, 6.
10
Ibid, 7.

the realist that at least some moral judgments are truth-apt. Where irrealists disagree is
whether those truths are dependent on human opinion or belief. Moral realists claim that
moral facts are features of situations or actions or people in the way that facts about
human physiology are objective feature of humans. A human’s internal body temperature
averages around 37۫ Celsius, independently of whether we perceive it or believe it. The
objectivity the realist tries to achieve is one independent of belief, but it is not objectivity
completely independent of humans. Just as it would not make any sense to talk about the
temperature of humans if no humans existed, the moral realist claims that moral features
depend on the existence of [human] beings. Peter Railton suggests, that “(G)ood and bad
would have no place within a universe consisting only of stones, for nothing matters to
stones. Introduce some people, and you will have introduced the possibility of value as
well.”11 The notions of good and bad depend in some way on the existence of sentient
beings.
Irrealism12, by contrast, claims that the truth of moral judgments is dependent on
what humans actually believe. For example, some irrealists such as moral relativists believe
that moral judgments are truth apt. The moral judgment ‘Burning babies is wrong’ really is
true or false but on the irrealist view, only for a given society. The truth or falsity of these
propositions depends on the society where one utters the claim. So, in a society that believes
that burning babies is wrong, the moral judgment ‘Burning babies is wrong’ is true. For
relativists, it does matter what humans believe about a certain situation.
The fourth question one asks is what type of properties are the moral properties that
moral judgments purport to describe? Three ways exist for answering this question. The first
11

Peter Railton. Facts, Values, and Norms: Essays Towards a Morality of Consequence. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 46.
12
Some philosophers call Irrealism antirealism, but the distinction is not important for my purposes.

is naturalism. According to this theory, properties and facts are natural if they are those that
are ‘studied’ by the natural and social sciences. Therefore, ethical naturalism claims that the
moral properties that moral judgments describe are natural properties, “properties
that are or will be mentioned in the best development of the natural sciences, including
psychology and other social sciences.”13 The key element in all of the sciences, either natural
or social, is that they determine the truth or falsity of their hypothesis a posteriori, i.e.,
through empirical methods. Thus, natural properties are ones who existence is empirically
verifiable.
The second way to understand moral properties is supernaturalism. Supernaturalism purports
to study supernatural facts and properties and identifies moral properties with such facts.
Theological accounts of morality fit this model. Thus, according to one advocate of a
theological morality, good consists in a sort of resemblance to God.14
The third approach is non-naturalism, which claims that the moral properties are
neither natural properties nor supernatural properties: rather they are sui generis.15 They are
neither facts nor properties that we discover in either natural or supernatural inquiry. No
method of science or theology will reveal to us whether these sui generis properties exist.
Russ Shafer-Landau develops a non-naturalist position in which moral facts are not
discoverable by either the natural or supernatural sciences. Rather, these facts are selfevident; we come to know them simply by knowing the content of the moral proposition.16

13

Adams, Robert Merrihew. Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999. 58
14
Robert Adams defends this position in his book, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
15
Shafer-Landau, Russ. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. 57
16
Ibid, 8.

If one takes the naturalist option, for which I argue, then one must ask whether these
moral facts are reducible to nonmoral facts. There are two approaches on this issue,
reductionism and non-reductionism. According to a reductionist, moral properties
are, or reduce to, properties we refer to in our natural sciences. As Shafer-Landau states,
reductionist ethical naturalism “envisions moral properties as finding a place within an
ontology whose contents are fixed exclusively by the outcomes of scientific investigation.”17
It is not as though reductionists do not believe in the reality of moral facts; rather they
believe in moral facts because they are species of natural facts.18
Non-reductionists claim that moral properties are a class of natural properties that we
cannot reduce to any other natural property. Alexander Miller states, “Moral properties are
constituted by, supervene upon, or are multiply realized by non-moral properties.”19 ShaferLandau describes non-reductionism as the thesis that “Moral properties are like geological or
biological properties; natural ones themselves, dependent ultimately, for their realization on
physical properties, but not identical to physical properties.”20
Although the series of metaethical questions I have presented are not exhaustive, the
answers to them give a general outline to the metaethical positions one can take. It is
interesting to note that these questions are often not answered independently of one another.
For example, if one claims to be a naturalist and a non-reductionist, then one logically has to
be a realist and a cognitivist.
My intention in this chapter was to present briefly, the main questions of metaethics
and the various kinds of answers philosophers have given to them. The position I take in the

17

Ibid, 63.
Ibid, 19.
19
Miller, Alexander. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003, 139.
20
Shafer Landau, 63.
18

succeeding chapters is one that claims that moral judgments are propositions and that some
of them are in fact (approximately) true.

Chapter 2: Richard Boyd and David Brink’s Moral Realism
My aim in Chapter One was to set the stage for examining in detail certain
metaethical theories by outlining the available metaethical positions. In this chapter, I
present the moral realist views of Richard Boyd and David Brink. In section I, I describe
Boyd’s three part moral realist thesis; in section II, I discuss how Boyd’s epistemological
claims establish scientific realism and explain his analogy between scientific realism and
moral realism. In section III, I discuss Boyd’s views on natural kinds, cluster definitions, and
reference. Section IV explicates Brink’s views on the nature of moral properties and finally,
in section V, I discuss Brink’s account of reflective equilibrium.

I. Richard Boyd’s Moral Realism
According to Richard Boyd, moral realism maintains three theses: (1) Moral
statements have truth values, (2) The truth value is largely independent of moral opinions,
beliefs or theories, and (3) “Ordinary canons” of reasoning (whether moral, scientific or
everyday) provide “a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral
knowledge.”21 As I will explicate it here, Boyd’s case for realism is primarily analogical. He
argues that moral realism is plausible because scientific realism is plausible, relying on a

21

Boyd, Richard N. “How to be a Moral Realist.” Essays on Moral Realism. Ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988. 182.

causal theory of knowledge and a semantics of natural kinds that invokes homeostatic
clusters.

II. Epistemology, belief regulation, and the argument from analogy
Boyd bases his defense of scientific realism on epistemological claims about
scientific reasoning. He asserts that not only are his epistemological claims realist and
naturalist throughout, but also dialectical. In what follows I first, briefly, compare two
contemporary theories of knowledge; foundationalist and causal. Second, I show why
Boyd’s epistemological theory fails to fit exactly into either category. Third, I will apply it to
science and show how the theory establishes scientific realism. Finally, I will show how his
epistemological theory supports moral realism.
Epistemologists generally conceive part of their enterprise as determining whether a
given belief will count as knowledge. Boyd discusses two contemporary approaches to this
enterprise, Foundationalism and Naturalized Epistemology (or causal theories of knowing).
Foundationalist theories of knowledge claim that some beliefs are indubitable, thus holding
an epistemically privileged place, and that they are known a priori. A prime example of a
foundational belief is the belief that one is having a particular perceptual experience, say, the
experience of the color red. For the foundationalist, paradigmatic instances of knowledge are
these types of foundational beliefs. Furthermore, a foundationalist, such as Descartes,
believes that the inferences made from these beliefs “are ultimately reducible to inferential

principles which can be shown a priori to be rational.”22 Therefore, a belief becomes
knowledge when it is one of these ‘foundational’ beliefs or is inferred via appropriate
rational principles from this class of foundational beliefs.
Whereas a foundationalist will claim some beliefs are incontrovertible, a causal
theorist or naturalized epistemologist will deny this. Causal theorists, such as Goldman23,
argue that only when a reliable belief-making mechanism produces a belief does one have a
claim to knowledge. Thus, no belief is incontestable since our belief making mechanisms are
fallible.24 Second, a causal theorist will deny inductive reasoning is justifiable on a priori
grounds. Rather, causal theorists claim, inductive reasoning is justifiable only to the extent
that it is reliable in the actual world. This means knowledge claims become a posteriori
matters.
Boyd’s view is similar to causal theories of knowledge in that he believes that
knowledge is an a posteriori matter and that it includes no foundational beliefs. However,
Boyd’s view is distinct from causal theories in the causal mechanism related to belief.
Whereas the causal theorist alleges that the causal mechanism is belief production, Boyd
avers, “the crucial causal notion in epistemology…[is]…reliable regulation of belief.”25
Causal theorists, such as Goldman, are concerned with how a belief is produced. They want
to know whether the belief is the result of, produced by, a reliable mechanism, e.g.,
perceptual apparatuses. For example, on Goldman’s account, my belief that their is a book
22

Ibid, 191.
See Goldman, Alvin. "A Causal Theory of Knowing," Journal of Philosophy 64 (1967): 357-372.
24
Although it may be the case that some beliefs, according to the causal theorist, do have an epistemic
privileged status, this status is merely contingent. For example, the belief of being in pain may hold an
epistemic privileged status because it seems that the belief making mechanism that is the cause of this
belief is very reliable. That is to say that it seems hard to doubt beliefs about our own recognition of pain
sensations. But this is merely a contingent matter: an agent’s internal mechanism, although highly reliable
can turn out to be wrong. See Boyd, Richard N. in “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.”
PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1980): 624.
25
Boyd, Richard. “How to be a Moral Realist,” in Essays on Moral Realism, 192.
23

on the bookshelf in front of me would count as knowledge so long as that belief was formed
as a result of a reliable belief making mechanism; I see the book in front of me. On the other
hand, a causal theorist of the Boydian type is not concerned with how a belief is
produced rather he argues that we should focus on sustaining our beliefs over time such that
we achieve a closer approximation to the truth.26 The difference between Boyd and
Goldman’s theories is that Goldman’s theory is a static theory whereas Boyd’s is concerned
with a process over time. For example, at time t1 I produce the belief call it x, through a
reliable beliefs making mechanism, e.g., my perceptual apparatuses. Under Goldman’s
theory, he would consider that belief knowledge because it was produced with a reliable
belief making mechanism. Whereas Boyd, would claim that we could not tell whether that
belief was knowledge. The reason Boyd believes this is because at time t1 were are not able
to tell whether this particular belief will lead to more accurate beliefs. Boyd states “[t]he
natural phenomena in which knowledge is manifested involves a dialectical process of
successive approximations to the truth, whose reliability consists in a tendency over time for
the successive approximations to be increasingly accurate.” On this interpretation,
knowledge of a particular subject matter itself leads to further improvements both in the
theory of the subject matter and its methodology, thus making the theory a closer
approximation of the truth. This is the dialectical nature of epistemology.
At this point in the discussion a digression is necessary to explicate how progress in
theories is dialectical. Theory progression is dialectical when the current theory omits errors
from previous theories while at the same time incorporating the elements of truth from those
theories. For example, Newtonian second law of mechanics dictates that force is equal to

26

Boyd, Richard N. in “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.” PSA: Proceedings of the
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1980): 630.

acceleration multiplied by mass, f=am. However, the problem with Newton’s theory is that it
makes false predictions in situations dealing with objects moving close to the speed of light
and with subatomic particles. To accommodate these new findings Albert Einstein
developed the theory of relativity. The theory accommodated the new findings while still
maintaining most of the Newton theory; Einstein kept the first two laws of mechanics.
Rather than delete the whole theory, Einstein deleted the errors and replaced them with new
theorems that could predict, accurately, the force of an object that moved near the speed of
light. We arrived at the theory of relativity because Newtonian theory was close to being true
such that it lead to further improvements in methodology and predictions. This is the
dialectical process. We increase our knowledge about the world through this change in
theory and the methods it uses for interpreting and collecting data, resulting in being able to
explain more about the world.
Returning to the epistemological claims, Boyd notes that this dialectical process
“involves…successive approximations to the truth, [and its] reliability consists in a tendency
over time for the successive approximations to be increasingly accurate.”27
Thus, to conceive of epistemology as providing a process of distinguishing claims of
knowledge from non-knowledge is mistaken.28 Rather than talk about whether a particular
belief will count as knowledge, epistemologists should concern themselves with describing
the causal mechanisms underling reliable belief regulation.

27

Boyd, Richard N. in “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.” PSA: Proceedings of the
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1980): 631.
28
Boyd states, “The aim of epistemology should be the naturalistic elucidation of the mechanisms of
reliable belief regulation rather than the formulation of a general definition of knowledge.” Boyd, Richard
N. in “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the
Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1980): 635.

Boyd believes science exemplifies his notion of reliable belief regulation. For
science, interaction between observation, theory, and methodology will lead to reliable belief
regulation and increasingly accurate approximations of the truth about nature.
Based on Boyd’s schema, we must satisfy two criteria for belief regulation. First, our initial
theories must be approximately true. Second, the theory must lead to improvements in
methodology and in the theory itself, thus exemplifying the dialectical process between past
and current theories.
First, we need to discuss whether our initial scientific theories were approximately
true. This amounts to asking whether our initial beliefs about the world were approximately
true. Boyd believes that our initial scientific theories were approximately true. Our initial
scientific beliefs, what I call our “folk theory of physics,” were probably such beliefs as,
trees exists; leaves fall from trees; there are objects in the sky; and that objects actually exist
in space and time. It is simply a descriptive matter whether our initial beliefs about the world
were approximately true and it has turned out that the majority of those beliefs were true. It
is this starting point of these background beliefs, folk physics, which leads to the dialectical
process of science.
Second, if they are approximately true, do the theories lead to improvements in the
theory and methodology and exemplify the dialectical process? Take for example the theory
of phlogiston: Was this theory approximately true such that it led to further improvements in
our theories of combustion and in our methodology for learning about combustion? The
answer is yes. Although, no such thing as phlogiston exists in an object, released when the
object is burned, the theory and its methods for testing did lead scientists to discover that
combustion requires oxygen. Even though the initial theory proved to be false, there was

enough truth in the theory and methodology such that it led to further theories containing
more accurate knowledge about the world.
The following is a graphic representation of the dialectical process that
occurs in science. This explanation abstracts away from the particular theories, e.g.,
phlogiston. Progress in scientific thought works along the following lines (see chart 1)29:
First, a scientific theory (T1) will recommend a particular method (M1) for predicting
observables (O1) and for hypothesizing about unobservables (U1).

Imagine that from our hypothesis of the unobservable (U1) we discover some other
observable phenomena (O2). This in turn changes our method for predicting observables
(M2), which in turn changes our theory (T3), (see chart 2).

29

This discussion and diagram comes from a Metaethics Seminar with Dr. Altman in fall of 2003.

We increase our knowledge about the world through this change in methodology and theory,
resulting in being able to explain more about the world. This is how science progresses. Our
initial theory (T1) was approximately true such that its methodology led to more accurate
beliefs about the world. We did not completely abandon our initial theory. Rather, we took
what is true from our initial theory (T1), added our new methods for discovering
unobservables and predicting observables and created a new theory (T2). At times, some
unobservables fail to acquire the status of observables. But, that does not mean they do not
play a role in progression of our scientific theories. For example, our theory (T2) postulates
something about an unobservable (U3). Assume our postulate is completely wrong about the
unobservable. It still may change our methods for discovering and predicting other
unobservables. Therefore, in answer to our second question, scientific progression does
exemplify this dialectical procedure. Furthermore, this interconnection and mutual influence

between our methodology, theory, observables and unobservables, reliably regulates our
beliefs, which in turn leads to improvements in knowledge.30 As Boyd claims,
“[N]ew theoretical knowledge leads to improvements in scientific language
and in methodology; better methodology leads to greater theoretical
knowledge, and so forth.”31
We come to know more about the world through this interaction.
Turning to how these epistemological claims establish scientific realism, one first
needs to get clear on the meaning of scientific realism. Scientific realism is
“the doctrine that the methods of science are capable of providing (partial
or approximate) knowledge of unobservable (‘theoretical’) entities, such
as atoms or electromagnetic fields, in addition to knowledge about the
behavior of observable phenomena (and of course, that the properties of
these and other entities studied by scientists are largely theoryindependent).”32
If reliable belief regulation is what occurs in science, as Boyd claims, then we have to
construe it realistically, because our theories and the methods they use are so reliable in their
predictions about unobservables and observables that the entities and relations the theory
postulates probably exist. Unlike the conventionalist theories of science, only a realistic
conception of scientific practices explains the reliability of these methods.
Boyd believes that there is an analogy between moral reasoning and scientific
reasoning and that if his epistemological claims account for progression in science, then they

30

For science a number of factors determine the reliability of belief regulation. Some of the features are
“approximate truth of background beliefs, soundness of experimental design, emphasis on
observational/experimental method, appropriateness of metaphysical hunches, freedom from prejudicial
political interference, reliability of the indoctrination of graduate students with respect to the more
“intuitive” and as yet unarticulated features of the “paradigm,” etc.” See Boyd, Richard N. in “Scientific
Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of
Science Association 2 (1980): 636. Note: There is no single method by which one can assess belief
regulation.
31
Boyd, Richard N. in “Scientific Realism and Naturalistic Epistemology.” PSA: Proceedings of the
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2 (1980): 615.
32
Boyd, Richard. “How to be a Moral Realist,” in Essays on Moral Realism, 188.

should work for morality as well. According to his epistemology, we began with
approximately true beliefs, folk physics, that led to further approximations in scientific
theorizing. Analogously he needs to describe what initial moral beliefs we had such
that they led to further approximations of the truth as a result from our moral and nonmoral
theorizing.33 These initial moral beliefs I will call “folk morality,” and they include what
Michael Smith calls the platitudes of morality.34 They include beliefs such as morality is
concerned with, among other things, human needs and their satisfaction; burning babies is
wrong; torturing someone for mere enjoyment is wrong; etc. Thus, the question becomes
whether our initial moral beliefs, our folk morality beliefs, were approximately true enough
that they lead to improvements in moral knowledge. The answer to this question will depend,
in some sense, on the adherence to a particular substantive moral theory.35 The substantive
moral theory that Boyd develops is consequentialist theory that places an emphasis on
human needs. This is not problematic because this belief is considered one of the folk
morality beliefs, i.e., one of the given moral platitudes. Boyd merely focuses his attention on
this platitude, although he could have focused on another. Thus, for Boyd, this question asks
whether we have come to understand and further our knowledge of human needs? Boyd’s
response is affirmative: that our understanding of societal and individual needs does improve
through this dialectical process.36

33

Ibid, 201.
Smith, Michael. The Moral Problem. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 1994, 40-41. Boyd does not need to
assert that Smith’s account of moral concepts, only that they both agree that there are some moral
platitudes.
35
Boyd does note that although the question will change depending on the particular theory of substantive
morality, “the very powerful semantic and epistemic resources of recent realist philosophy of science could
be effectively employed to defend moral realism on the basis of many of the alternative conceptions, [i.e.,
deontological and virtue theories.] Boyd, Richard. “How to be a Moral Realist,” in Essays on Moral
Realism, 202. A defense of different substantive moral theory could be given by placing the emphasis on
different moral platitudes.
36
Ibid, 207.
34

It seems clear that our understanding of human needs has improved throughout
history. For example, we learned that it is important to engage in cooperative efforts. Robert
Wright discusses the case of the Shoshone Indians of Western North America and
needing to cooperate to survive. He states,
“Although the Shoshone had no big game to hunt, jackrabbits were
afoot…To harvest them, the Shoshone employed a tool too large for one
family to handle—a net hundreds of feet long…On such occasions…More
than a dozen normally autonomous families would come together briefly
and cooperate under a ‘rabbit boss’.”37
The Shoshone recognized the need for cooperation for their survival. When these
multiply family units came together to capture rabbits they learned that cooperating as a
group allowed each of them to have an adequate amount of food for their survival thus
satisfying their own needs. This is one example of many throughout history of the
progressive recognition of our needs.
For Boyd knowledge acquisition in science and morality is a dialectical process that
starts from approximately true beleifs and leads to further accurate accounts of the world
through successive approximations. In the following sections I will discuss Boyd’s views on
natural kinds, property clusters and reference. In the subsequent section, I show that the
theory of reference that Boyd develops for natural kinds also involves a process of
successive approximations.

III. Natural Kinds, Property Clusters, and Reference
In the previous section, we saw how Boyd argues for a key analogy between science
and morality. He focuses on how both exemplify a dialectical process of successive
approximations to the truth. Because science is analogous to ethics, on Boyd’s account, and
37

Wright, Robert. NonZero: The Logic of Human Destiny, Pantheon Books: New York, 2000, 21

some scientific terms refer to “natural kinds,” it is as plausible to think that moral concepts
also refer to natural kinds.
Natural kinds, on Boyd’s realist interpretation, are intended to ‘cut the world
at its joints’ and exemplify the differences in nature. Because of the idea that natural kinds
are to ‘cut the world at its joints,’ Boyd believes natural kinds require natural rather than
stipulative definitions. We cannot decide by linguistic fiat on the essence of a natural kind;
rather we discover the essence a posteriori. For Boyd, the term ‘good’ is a natural-kind term
requiring a natural definition. The type of natural kind definition it requires is one involving
“a kind of property cluster together with an associated indeterminacy in extension.”38
Boyd offers two distinct ways of giving definitions for natural kinds. First, one can
specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for that kind. This is what I will call the
‘traditional’ sense of defining natural kinds. For example, some object exemplifies the
natural kind, water, if and only if it is made of H20. This means that being two parts
hydrogen and one part oxygen are the necessary and sufficient conditions for something
being water.
The second way of defining natural kind terms, he calls the “property cluster
definition.” In giving such a definition we specify a “collection of properties such that the
possession of an adequate number of these properties is sufficient for falling within the
extension of the term.”39 Furthermore, Boyd claims that these cluster definitions will have
extensional indeterminacy; there are failures of bivalence in which it is not possible to
determine whether a particular object exemplifies the kind in question. Boyd does not reject
the traditional method for defining natural kind terms. Rather, the traditional account is
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insufficient for particular cases, e.g., species, and his cluster method is way to define such
natural kind terms in an adequate way.
A cluster definition involves properties having a homeostatic relationship.
Homeostatic property clusters are sets of properties tending to be
“contingently clustered in nature [and]…this co-occurrence is the result of
what may be described as a sort of homeostasis. Either the presence of
some of the properties…tend[s] to favor the presence of the others, or
there are underlying mechanisms or processes which tend to maintain the
presence of the properties.”40
Homeostatic cluster definitions specify the properties of the kind, and an object is that kind
when it possesses most of those properties. This is why the extensions of some terms are
indeterminate. Some object may possess only some of the characteristics in the homeostatic
cluster, and thus it is unclear whether to include the object in the kind.
Boyd offers the example of a biological species, often taken as a paradigm of a
traditional natural kind, as a prime case requiring a homeostatic property-cluster definition.
He claims that, “imperfectly shared and homeostatically related morphological,
physiological, and behavioral features”41 characterize a member of a particular species.
Necessary and sufficient conditions are not possible to specify in such cases. For example,
an animal could possess only the morphological and physiological traits but still qualify as a
member of a particular species.
In conjunction with his account of natural kinds, Boyd develops a Kripke/Putnam
type naturalistic causal theory of reference for these kind terms. According to this theory,
“Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property,
relation, etc.) k just in case there exist[s] causal mechanisms whose
tendency is to bring it about, over time, that what is predicated of the term
t will be approximately true of k…Such mechanisms will typically include
40
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the existence of procedures which are approximately accurate for
recognizing members or instances of k (at least for easy cases) and which
relevantly govern the use of t, the social transmission of certain relevantly
approximately true beliefs regarding k, formulated as claims about t…, a
pattern of deference to experts on k with respect to the use of t, etc…When
regulations of this sort obtain, we may think of the properties of k as
regulating the use of t (via such causal relations), and we may think of
what is said using t as providing us with socially coordinated epistemic
access to k; t refers to k (in nondegenerate cases) just in case the socially
coordinated use of t provides significant epistemic access to k, and not
other kinds (properties, etc.).”42
Thus, features of the world causally regulate our use of a term and these features fix the
referent of the term in question. For example, the term ‘tiger’ will refer to the kind ‘tigers’
just in case our use of the term ‘tiger,’ our methods for picking out tigers and the spreading
of approximately true beliefs about ‘tigers’ bring about over time that what we predicate of
the term ‘tiger’ is approximately true of the kind, tigers. These causal mechanisms allow us
to improve our knowledge of tigers and thus our beliefs about tigers become more
approximately true.
We can now see that Boyd’s theory of reference incorporates the dialectical process
exemplified by scientific theories and methodologies. It is a dialectical process of successive
approximations. Determining what regulates the use of a term is a process of refinements
over time, such that we preserve the elements of truth from earlier uses of the term while
eliminating errors from that previous use.43 For example, we initially believed that our use of
the term ‘tiger’ was causally regulated by the set of properties including being an animal that
has stripes, live births and nurses its young. We also believed that it included being an
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animal that only lives in a particular region of Africa.44 We developed a new use of the term,
through a dialectical process, when we deleted the property of living in a certain location
after we found tigers in other areas.
Furthermore, this process of determining the causal mechanism underlying a term is a
process of successive approximations; our terms “undergo a development…typically in the
direction of a closer and ‘tighter’ fit between [our term in use] and the important causal
features of reality.”45 In the tiger example, our beliefs about tigers become increasingly
accurate as experience modifies our use of the term.
Given these claims about our scientific natural kinds and our history with being
unable to offer a traditional natural kind definition of ‘good,’ perhaps a cluster property
definition is reasonable to consider. In such a definition, the kind ‘good’ would ultimately
depend on the substantive moral theory. Boyd’s morality is consequentialist in essence but
he renders the platitudes discussed in section into coherent picture. From this particular
moral theory, he offers a definition of the kind ‘good’ in terms of basic human needs. He
describes these as follows:
"Some of these needs are physical or medical. Others are psychological or
social…Under a wide variety of (actual and possible) circumstances these
human goods (or rather instances of the satisfaction of them) are
homeostatically clustered. In part they are clustered because these goods
themselves are –when present in balance and moderation –mutually
supporting.”46
Thus, Boyd suggests that this cluster of contingent natural facts about basic human needs
defines moral goodness. For Boyd, the key to moral realism lies in the idea of a homeostatic
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cluster conception of ‘good.’ If good actions are those actions satisfying basic human needs,
a natural fact, then these actions will have the property of goodness objectively, i.e., the
actions will have the property no matter what we believe about them.
Given Boyd’s claims about natural kinds and the theory of reference for natural
kinds, by analogy then, the term ‘good’ will refer to the homeostatic cluster of basic needs
and in fact this cluster regulates our use of the term ‘good.’ As Boyd points out, “it is
characteristic of what we recognize as moral discourse…that consideration to human wellbeing play a significant role in determining what is said to be ‘good.’”47 He does not claim
that our conception of human well-being is correct, only that it is approximately true so that
we are lead in the right direction for further knowledge of human well-being. If Boyd is right
in his conception of ‘good’ as a homeostatic cluster concept, then the presence of certain
parts of the cluster would tend to favor other parts of the cluster, e.g., the satisfaction of the
need for some type of physical recreation might accompany a love for that recreation. The
needs causally interact to sustain one another such that the cluster of these needs exhibits a
particular kind of causal structure of natural properties. Thus, the term ‘good’ refers to that
natural causal structure.
Boyd’s main argument for moral realism rely on current theories in semantics and
epistemology. What he does not offer is a detailed account of the metaphysical nature of
moral properties, outside of saying that they are natural properties homeostically related to
one another. However, a clear realist account of the metaphysical nature of moral properties
is needed to complete the defense of moral realism. David Brink offers one such account. I
now turn to that account.
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IV. Brink’s Realism
Brink’s realism is comprised of two main theses. First, moral facts or properties are
simply “constituted by [or causally realized by], but not identical with, natural and
social scientific facts and properties.”48 Brink means that certain arrangements of natural
properties make up or realize moral properties. An analogy not involving moral terms helps
us to understand the constitutive, or causal, relationship between the two different kinds of
properties. For example, certain arrangements of parts, a muffler, engine, transmission, etc.,
make up or realize the property of being a car. So, being a car is nothing more than different
arrangements of the individual parts; certain arrangements of parts will constitute a car. It is
not the case that being a car is identical with a particular arrangement of parts because one
can have different arrangements of parts but still be called a car. If a car was identical to a
particular arrangement of parts, then only that arrangement of parts will qualify as being a
car. Given that many different arrangements of parts qualify as being a car it follows that a
car is not identical to a particular arrangement of parts.
The same relationship is true of moral properties or facts and natural properties or
facts. The property of goodness is nothing more than certain arrangements of natural facts;
social, biological, and psychological facts will ‘make up’ or realize the property of goodness.
This does not mean that these natural facts are identical with the moral facts. They are not
identical because completely different sets of natural facts can realize or constitute the same
moral facts or properties.
Second, “moral properties are functional properties…[and]…what is essential to
moral properties is the causal role which they play in the characteristic activities of human
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organisms.”49 Brink draws an analogy between the way functionalists in the philosophy of
mind construe mental properties and how moral realists might construe functional moral
properties. .
Functionalists believe that certain arrangements of facts make up mental states, which
is why functionalists believe multiple physical systems can realize a single type of mental
state. The example of pain demonstrates this idea. Humans realize pain via a certain structure
of neurons and synapses. However, this is not the only way to realize pain. A Martian, for
example, could be in pain even though it does not have the same structure as the human
brain. The Martian could have some other physical substance that realizes pain. Furthermore,
functionalists believe that these mental properties have causal powers. For example, being in
the mental state of pain causes one to wince, grimace or groan.
In the same way that different physical systems realize the same mental state,
different sets of natural facts realize the same moral facts or properties. For example, living a
healthy life, having shelter and having friends are a set a facts that realize the property
‘goodness.’ But the property of goodness also could be instantiated in the set of natural facts
comprised of having food, being able to listen to music and living in society that allows free
speech. In either case, both sets of natural facts realize the same property, ‘goodness.’

V. Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Theory
To construct a moral theory, Brink thinks that we should go through a process of
‘reflective equilibrium.’ He describes this process as a method of achieving coherence
between our theoretical and particular moral judgments. We do this by identifying
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“[t]heoretical claims about value that will explain and support a number of
our firmly held evaluative beliefs. We then (further) assess these theories
by comparing their implications about the value of real and imaginary
states of affairs, lives, activities and actions with our own independent
assessments of the value of those states of affairs, lives, activities and
actions.”50
Through this process, we make changes in our theories or in our particular judgments until
we converge upon a consistent moral theory that takes into account our different considered
moral judgments. For example, Eric, an undergraduate philosophy student, believes in the
principle that you should not cause harm to other animals, call this (P). Suppose also that he
believes that it is acceptable to eat chickens; call this (E). It is likely that he will one day
realize that his principle comes into conflict with his judgment about chickens. Eric has
multiple options to resolve this conflict. First, he could alter (P) and hold that if is wrong to
cause unnecessary harm to other animals; call this (P1). Second, he could abandon the
principle altogether choosing another that states: only the pain of those animals that have
rationality count morally; call this (P3). Third, he could change to the belief that eating
chickens is not acceptable. In either situation, Eric changes his principles or particular
judgments attempting to achieve a consistent moral theory. He thereby engages in the
process of reflective equilibrium.
One distinction Brink implicitly makes is between narrow and wide reflective
equilibrium. Narrow reflective equilibrium is an equilibrium established between our
considered judgments when “one is to be presented with only those descriptions which more
or less match one’s existing judgments except for minor discrepancies…”51 In this type of
equilibrium one is not presented with drastically differing theories consulting with one’s
considered judgments. All that one looks for is a theory that calls for the fewest revisions to
50
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achieve consistency.52 This method is distinct from wide reflective equilibrium. Principles
accepted on grounds of wide reflective equilibrium are those that “people would
acknowledge and accept the consequences of when they have had an opportunity to
consider other plausible conceptions and to assess their supporting grounds.”53 In this type of
reflective equilibrium, those involved in the process are presented with arguments for
alternative theories. The agent chooses either to alter their considered judgments in light of
these new theories or to keep their considered judgments in light of this new evidence. The
key distinction to this type of reflective equilibrium is the scope of alternative theories
considered: one considers all competing theories.
Boyd’s dialectical method is an example of a narrow form of reflective equilibrium.
As our theories progress, under this procedure, we do not consider drastic variations from
our well confirmed beliefs, e.g., we do not consider theories that eliminate the belief that our
galaxy is one among thousands because this belief is well confirmed. He states,
“We, in fact, take seriously only those theories which relatively closely
resemble our existing theories in respect of their ontological commitments
and the laws they contain. [For example,] we prefer theories, [in science,]
which quantify over familiar ‘theoretical entities’--or at least entities very
much like familiar ones…”54
We do not consider all alternative theories, as wide equilibrium requires, rather we only
consider those that closely resemble our current theories and that maintain our well
confirmed beliefs or our considered moral judgments. This is not to say that we never give
up our well confirmed beliefs, only that we choose theories that maintain these beliefs or
similar beliefs.
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Brink also believes that the method of reflective equilibrium is truth conducive. So,
when we undertake the process of (wide or narrow) reflective equilibrium, the theory that we
converge will be the true theory of the subject matter. For example, if humans get
together and bring their beliefs about the microstructure of matter into reflective equilibrium,
then the theory they converge upon will be the true theory about the microstructure of
matter. Brink believes that this process is truth conducive because the set of coherent beliefs
achieved through reflective equilibrium coheres with what he calls second-order beliefs.
These beliefs “include beliefs at various levels of generality about the nature and reliability
of our belief-formation mechanisms.”55 These second-order beliefs include beliefs about
when a particular belief or group of beliefs is true and why these beliefs are true. For Brink,
these beliefs are about reliable belief making mechanisms and why these mechanisms
produce true beliefs. Thus, if our particular beliefs about a subject matter are coherent
themselves and cohere with our second-order beliefs, then we are justified in saying that our
particular coherent set is also true.
Brink’s realism is summed up as the thesis that moral properties are functional
properties whose naturalistic base is specified by whatever moral theory emerges under
reflective equilibrium. When one combines this with the theory of Boyd, a more robust
realism results. This combined theory is summed in the following way: moral terms rigidly
designate functional properties specified by a substantive moral theory achieved under
reflective equilibrium. Furthermore, moral terms are causally regulated by and refer to the
functional properties specified by the moral theory.56
VI. Conclusion:
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My aim in this chapter was to give an account of the realist theories offered by
Richard Boyd and David Brink. Boyd offers a naturalistic conception of epistemology and
reference that are both dialectical processes of successive approximations to the
truth. Boyd then uses these theories to defend scientific realism, showing that scientific
knowledge is a dialectical process and that scientific terms exhibit this same process. He then
draws an analogy between scientific realism and moral realism, showing that moral realism
can be defended on the same grounds as scientific realism.
Brink’s realism focused on the nature of moral properties and the justification
procedure for moral theories. According to Brink, moral properties are constituted out of
groupings of natural properties and this allows for multiple sets of natural properties to
realize the same moral property. Furthermore, we are justified in believing our moral
theories so long as they are the result of reflective equilibrium. In this process, one considers
competing theories and selects the theory that best coheres with our considered moral
judgments.
In the following chapter, I present an objection offered by Terry Horgan and Mark
Timmons. The objection claims that there is a contradiction inherent in the combined views
of Boyd and Brink. I then offer a response to this objection, showing why there is no
contradiction between the two views. Accordingly, the realist theories of Brink and Boyd
can be conjoined to provide a fuller and more persuasive form of realism than either theory
provides alone.

Chapter 3: Defending Moral Realism
In a recent article, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons claim that, by embracing a
certain type of moral realism, David Brink and Richard Boyd have been “led down
the garden path into the camp of the moral relativist.”57 This chapter addresses whether
relativism actually follows from the views discussed in Chapter Two. In section I, I examine
elaborations of the views of Boyd and Brink that Horgan and Timmons offer. In section II, I
reconstruct the Horgan/Timmons argument for the thesis that Brink/Boyd realism leads to
relativism. This relativism is a form of irrealism that contradicts the realism Brink and Boyd
seek to defend. Finally, in section III, I offer a response to the Horgan/Timmons argument,
casting doubt on its cogency.

I. Illuminating Boyd and Brink
It is interesting to note whether the realist positions of Boyd and Brink are consistent.
A through going naturalist such as Boyd asserts that moral properties are identical with
homeostatic clusters of natural properties; moral properties are identical with sets of natural
properties. Whereas Brink claims that moral properties are not identical with natural
properties rather they constituted out of sets of natural properties, i.e., moral properties
supervene on sets of natural properties. These moral properties are not the natural properties
themselves rather the moral properties are generated as it were, out of the set of natural
properties. This dispute between whether moral properties are identical with natural
properties is a large issue in contemporary metaethics that cannot be resolved in within this
paper. In what follows I will assume with Horgan and Timmons that these positions are
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compatible and show why the conjoined position of Boyd and Brink does not lead to a
contradiction.
One key insight that Horgan and Timmons offer regarding Boyd’s semantics
is that, since Boyd construes moral terms as natural kind terms, it is reasonable to assume to
that they are rigid designators.

58

A term is a rigid designator “if in every possible world

[where the referent exists] it designates the same object.”59 The term ‘water’ is a rigid
designator because in all possible worlds that term designates the same set of properties,
H2O. If ‘good’ is rigid designator, then in all possible worlds the term will designate the
same properties. Furthermore, because moral terms are analogous to natural-kind terms, they
will refer to natural properties; moral terms will rigidly refer to the same natural properties in
all possible worlds. Using Boyd’s definition of ‘good’, if ‘good’ is a rigid designator then in
all possible worlds the term ‘good’ will refer to the cluster of natural properties that satisfy
basic human needs.
The clarifying point that Horgan and Timmons offer for Brink has to do with his
characterization of moral properties. As Brink himself notes, psycho-functionalism in the
philosophy of mind motivates his account of moral properties. Functionalism characterizes
mental properties as multiply realizable functional properties defined by a theory of
psychology that humans arrive at after sufficient empirical research. Psycho-functionalists,
in particular, assert that this theory, T, will allow humans to give determinate functional
properties for mental states and these
“Determinate functional properties are implicitly defined by T,
presumably, because within the generalizations comprising T, mental
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terms are interconnected in rich and numerous ways with non-mental
terms describing sensory inputs and behavioral outputs. These rich
interconnections provide the basis for ‘pinning down’ as it were unique
functional properties. [Therefore,] mental terms [will] refer to these
functional properties implicitly defined by the empirical theory T.”60
To ‘pin down’ as it were the unique functional properties, the reader is to consider a
complete psychological theory and define the mental states from that theory via inputs and
outputs already known. In specifying these unique mental states one develops what
philosophers call a Ramsey sentence, i.e., an existentially quantified sentence, for our
particular mental theory. Jim Pryor describes this process as the following:
“[S]uppose we have a theory about how our various mental states are
causally related to each other, and to input and output: Mental
Theory:[part of such a theory might be]...and pain is caused by pin pricks,
and pain causes worry and the emission of loud noises, and worry in turn
causes brow-wrinkling...[The bold terms represent the mental states
needing to be defined. Whereas, the italicized terms are inputs and outputs
we already understand.] Now, we [create] the Ramsey Sentence for our
mental theory [by extracting from our theory the terms to be defined and
represent them by existential quantifiers]: x1 x2 (...and x1 is caused by pin
pricks, and x1 causes x2 and the emission of loud noises, and x2 in turn
causes brow-wrinkling...). Next we define what it is to be in pain, and to
be worried, as follows: A person is in pain = x1 x2 (...and x1 is caused by
pin pricks, and x1 causes x2 and the emission of loud noises, and x2 in turn
causes brow-wrinkling...) & the person has x1. A person is worried = x1
x2 (...and x1 is caused by pin pricks, and x1 causes x2 and the emission of
loud noises, and x2 in turn causes brow-wrinkling...) & the person has
x2.”61
Therefore, a correlate Ramsey sentence specifies a unique functional property for
each mental state, and these existentially quantified sentences specify an individual mental
state.
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According to Horgan and Timmons, Brink would characterize moral properties in the
same method. Suppose we have a theory about how moral goods causally relate to each other
and to inputs and outputs such that: Moral Theory:…and goodness causes the
satisfaction of basic human needs, and goodness causes rightness and the fulfillment of
wants, and rightness in turn causes flourishing of humans. (The bold terms represent the
moral terms needing to be defined. Whereas, the italicized terms are inputs and outputs we
already understand.) Now, we create the Ramsey Sentence for our Moral Theory that will
define each moral propertey (by extracting from our theory the terms to be defined and
represent them by existential quantifiers:) x1 x2 (...and x1 is caused by satisfaction of basic
human needs, and x1 causes x2 and the fulfillment of wants, and x2 in turn causes flourishing
of humans...). Next we define goodness and rightness as: Something is good = x1 x2 (and x1
is caused by satisfaction of basic human needs, and x1 causes x2 and the fulfillment of wants,
and x2 in turn causes flourishing of humans...). Something is right = x1 x2 (and x1 is caused
by satisfaction of basic human needs, and x1 causes x2 and the fulfillment of wants, and x2 in
turn causes flourishing of humans).
Given the discussion in Chapter Two and the substantive moral theory that Boyd
supplies this characterization of moral properties matches well with Brink’s view. It is
consequentialist in nature and specifies the correlate Ramsey Sentences based on that theory.
However, if the substantive moral theory were different the set of properties specified by the
moral theory would be likely to change. For example, a deontological theory specifies a set
of properties having to do with duty fulfilling rather than the fulfilling of human needs.
Given this characterization, I now turn to the Horgan and Timmons objection to the views of
Boyd and Brink.

II. Conceptual and Standard Relativity
As I suggested in previous chapters the views of Boyd and Brink seem
compatible in that they present different aspects of a moral realist position. Horgan and
Timmons believe that Boyd and Brink’s views together yield the following view, which they
call “New Wave Moral Semantics:”
“moral terms [are] rigid designators of functional properties that are
definable via the normative theory to which humans allegedly would
converge if they did wide reflective equilibrium ideally well. These terms
allegedly are causally regulated by, and thus allegedly refer to, those
functional properties.”62
This view, Horgan and Timmons claim, ultimately leads to a relativistic metaethical position
rather than a realist view. To illustrate this claim Horgan and Timmons use the following
hypothetical situation:
Suppose there is indeed some single normative moral theory Th to which
humans in general would converge, were they to perform wide reflective
equilibrium ideally well. For concreteness, suppose it is some
consequentialist theory; call it Tc. Suppose too that the generalizations of
Tc link moral terms to non-moral terms in sufficiently rich and sufficiently
numerous ways that each moral term has [determinate natural properties
specified by] Tc. Imagine a race of Martians who differ from humans in
the following ways. First, being much like humans in their level of
sophistication and their social institutions, Martians too employ moral
terms and concepts; their moral vocabulary is intertranslatable with our
own. Second, if Martians were to perform wide reflective equilibrium
ideally well, they too would converge on some single moral theory –but a
different one than Tc. For concreteness, suppose it is some deontological
theory; call it Td. Third, Td links moral terms to nonmoral terms in such a
way that each moral term has [determinate natural properties specified by]
Td.63
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It follows, according to Horgan and Timmons, that the martian term ‘good’ rigidly
designates the set of natural properties specified by Td and the human term ‘good’ rigidly
designates the set of natural properties specified by Tc64. Thus, if the Brink/Boyd
view is correct, and our moral terms rigidly designate a set of properties, then when both
groups meet and appear to have a substantive disagreement, it turns out that they actually do
not have a genuine disagreement.65 This is because the “orthographically identical human
and [Martian] words [‘good’] have different meanings, as well as different referents.”66 In
the scenario they construct, Horgan and Timmons simply specify that the referents, what is
causally regulating the use of the ‘orthographically identical’ terms, are different sets of
natural properties.67 What regulates the use of the term is a set of natural properties specified
by the specific and different moral theories. Furthermore, Horgan and Timmons believe that
it follows from the conjoint views of Brink and Boyd that what causally regulates the use of
a term will determine the meaning of that term. Thus, if two parties have ‘orthographically
identical’’ terms that are causally regulated by different properties, then those terms will
have different meanings. So, for example, on Earth, ‘good’ means those things that satisfy
basic human needs. Whereas on Mars, the term means those things that have to do with
fulfilling the categorical imperative because those are the things that regulating the use of the
terms. Thus, the humans and martians differ in meaning.
If the humans and martians actually mean and refer to different things, then the
Brink/Boyd view is committed to saying that when the two parties meet there is no
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substantive disagreement between the two parties. This is so because in order to have a
genuine disagreement you need to have the same meaning between parties. Thus, the
Brink/Boyd view is a form of conceptual relativism rather than realism.
This version of relativism holds that
“terms used by different groups are sufficiently different in meaning as to
be not intertranslatable...[and when]...groups of people appear to have
radically different and incompatible moral views, there is actually
semantic and conceptual incommensurability at work—so that their
respective, apparently contradictory, claims actually are so different in
meaning as to be effectively parts of different, non-intertranslatable,
languages.”68
The Martian scenario exemplifies conceptual relativity between the two uses of the
term ‘good’ because Earthlings and Martians have different meanings for their terms. Thus,
they have no disagreement because the two populations are not talking about one and the
same thing.

III. Problems with Horgan and Timmons and the proper Boydian response
The core of Horgan and Timmons’ conceptual relativity argument against the
Brink/Boyd view is the idea that there is a contradiction between the rigid designation thesis
and the reflective equilibrium thesis. The rigid designation thesis requires that a term in the
same sense, e.g. moral, designate the same set of properties in all possible worlds. On the
other hand, the reflective equilibrium thesis states that each of the species will converge on a
different moral theory that specifies different properties for the referent of the term ‘good.’
The contradiction arises because the moral theories achieved under ideal wide reflective
equilibrium specify that the ‘good,’ in its moral sense, rigidly designate different properties.
However, this cannot be the case because a rigid designator designates the same properties in
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all possible worlds; hence the contradiction. Thus, given the semantic thesis of rigid
designation and the thesis of wide reflective equilibrium we cannot make sense of the
competing moral senses of the term ‘good.’
The following is detailed exposition of the argument.
1.
For Earthlings a consequentialist normative theory achieved under
(wide) reflective equilibrium specifies the determinate natural properties
that regulates the use of the term ‘good,’ in its moral sense, on Earth.69
2.
For Martians a deontological normative theory achieved under
(wide) reflective equilibrium specifies the determinate natural properties
that regulates the use of the term ‘good,’ in its moral sense, on Mars.
3.
In either situation, the term ‘good,’ in the moral sense of the term,
rigidly designates a different set of natural properties specified by the
normative theory.
4.
The rigid designation thesis claims that a term designate the same
set of properties in all possible worlds.
5.
Thus, there is an inherent contradiction between what the wide
reflective equilibrium thesis requires and what the rigid designation thesis
requires.
The problem is that premises one and two contradict premise four. The wide reflective
equilibrium thesis contradicts the rigid designation thesis.
The best response for the Brink/Boyd position is to claim that the contradiction is
nonexistent. This is because Horgan and Timmons fail to recognize a key aspect of Boyd’s
semantic/epistemological theses and a key part to Brink’s reflective equilibrium.
In the scenario with the Earthlings and Martians, Horgan and Timmons would agree
that both species are talking about the same subject matter of morality. Given this condition
and assuming that the initial beliefs about morality held by both the Martians and Earthlings
are approximately true, a contradiction does not follow. Both groups will converge, through
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the process of wide reflective equilibrium, on the same true moral theory that specifies a set
of properties that regulates the use of the term ‘good’ in all possible worlds.
Imagine that Earthlings have approximate true beliefs about morality. For
example, they believe that unnecessary suffering is wrong, you ought to help others when it
is no great cost to you, etc. Also, imagine that Martians have approximately true beliefs
about morality. They believe that you should partake in those activities that promote the
virtues, you should never treat another as means to an end, etc. In each situation, the beliefs
are approximate truths about morality. When each species goes through the process of ideal
wide reflective equilibrium, they will converge on the true moral theory.70 The initial
approximately true beliefs increase our chances that the species will converge on the truth
though the process of wide reflective equilibrium because we know the direction to proceed,
and if the process of reflective equilibrium is ideal then it guarantees that we have considered
all of theories and converge on the truth.71
There is one case where different species would not come to the same conclusions
about morality or about what causally regulates the use of the term ‘good.’ If either species
starts with moral beliefs that were so far from the moral truth that their beliefs are not even
approximately true, then we should expect the varying species to come to different moral
theories specifying different moral properties regulating the use of the term. This is how
Horgan and Timmons implicitly construe their scenario. They do not take into account the
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This is true only at the end of the wide reflective equilibrium process. One can imagine that when
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this comment to Dr. George Rainbolt.
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converge on a different single moral theory and that the theory is the true theory because it is a result of
wide reflective equilibrium. See Horgan, and Timmons. “From Moral Realist to Moral Relativism in one
easy Step.” Critica Vol XXVIII 1996, 21.

approximate truth part of Boyd’s semantic and epistemological thesis, nor do they challenge
the capacity of the method of reflective equilibrium to arrive at the truth if conducted ideally.
I believe that using a case not involving morality helps to show why the
rigid designation thesis and the wide reflective equilibrium thesis fail to contradict. Imagine
that Earthling astronomers and Martian astronomers both have theories about planetary
motion. For simplicity, assume that the Earthlings start with a view about the heavens that
includes Ptolemaic beliefs about epicycles, that the objects in the sky are really up there, that
gods are not controlling the objects, that the objects actually move and so on. Also assume
that the Martians start with a view that includes Keplerian beliefs about ellipses, that the
objects in the sky are really up there, that gods are not controlling the objects, that the
objects actually move and so on. According to Boyd’s semantic thesis, both the Martians and
Humans have enough approximately true beliefs about astronomy. The large group of
ordinary beliefs helps species get a grip on the nature of the heavens such that when each of
the species partakes in wide reflective equilibrium, they eventually converge upon the same
true theory because their initial approximations start them in the right direction. It is not
possible that both groups will come to different conclusions since they already have
approximate truths about the one true theory about planetary motion. Unless, either the
Humans or Martians start with a set a beliefs about planetary motion that are not
approximately true, then it is not possible that they would come to different theories about
planetary motion in ideal wide reflective equilibrium.
The case of morality is analogous to the case of planetary motion. If we both start
with approximate true beliefs about a subject matter and then we proceed under ideal
reflective equilibrium, we will converge on the same theory. Just as we converge on one

theory of planetary motion, we will converge on only one theory of morality. So long as the
species start with approximately true beliefs about morality then it is not possible that they
would come to different moral theories under ideal reflective equilibrium. They
both would converge on the same moral theory that specifies a set of properties that causally
regulates the use of the term ‘good.’ This shows that the Brink/Boyd view does not contain
an inherent contradiction. Given the two theses of rigid designation and wide reflective
equilibrium, the species will not converge on different moral theories that specify different
sets of natural properties that causally regulates their uses of the term ‘good,’ i.e., conjoining
the views of Boyd and Brink is logically possible without contradiction.
In this chapter, I have established that there is no inherent contradiction in the
combined views of David Brink and Richard Boyd. I have done this by showing that both
Martians and Humans would converge upon the same moral theory under wide reflective
equilibrium assuming that they both start with approximately true beliefs about morality. My
method has been to reconstruct the Horgan and Timmons Martian scenario arguing for
relativism and show why it is not possible that this conclusion follows from the Brink/Boyd
view.

IV. Conclusion
This thesis set out to defend a combined version of moral realism that suggests
answers to the questions presented in Chapter One. The version I have defended is a
combined view of David Brink and Richard Boyd. My aim has been to assess the claims
made by Horgan and Timmons that there is an inherent contradiction between the views of
Brink and Boyd.

The combined view of Brink and Boyd asserts that moral judgments are the types of
statements that have truth-value. The Brink/Boyd view claims that at least some of our moral
propositions are in fact true and that we should defend this version of realism on
grounds analogous to that of scientific realism. As the scientific realist claims, the beliefs
about scientific matters are about facts independent of those beliefs because we could not
have the predictability in science that we do without it being the case. Since I have shown,
through the exposition of Richard Boyd’s position, that moral realism should be considered
analogous to that of scientific realism then we should consider our beliefs about morality, as
we do with science, as concerning facts that are independent of those beliefs. Furthermore,
these moral facts should be characterized as natural facts defined by the moral theory we
achieve under wide reflective equilibrium. Once I characterized moral realism in this
fashion, I was able to show that the combined view of Brink and Boyd does not fall victim to
the objection that Horgan and Timmons claim.
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